In which Islamic theocracy were there immediate and repeated public outpourings of sympathy for Americans following the 9/11 attacks in 2001? Few Americans know that hundreds of Iranians gathered publicly to pay their respects and to show their solidarity with the American people, first on 13 September, then in two other candlelight vigils. The crowds chanted "Death to terrorism!" "Death to Bin Laden!" and, "America: condolences, condolences!" Three days after the attacks, a moment of silence for the American tragedy was held before the start of the World cup-qualifying soccer game, the same day the Tehran Friday prayer leader said the terrorist attacks against America were "heart-rending...Everyone condemns, denounces, and is saddened...by it." While note of the candlelight vigils appeared in some Western papers, Iranian sympathy for the U.S. terrorist tragedy is largely unknown here. Because of widespread predetermined and unchallenged assumptions about Iran, these sorts of positive public attitudes nearly inconceivable to many Americans. American misperception and a lack of clear thinking about Iran significantly affect policy making and unnecessarily close off policy options. Currently, the United States is grappling with how to respond to suspected Iranian development of a nuclear weapons capability while Iran's 2005 presidential elections just constituted a conservative monopoly over domestic political institutions. Significant features of Iranian demographics present both an opportunity for a major political breakthrough as well as the conditions for potential serious long-term hostilities with the United States. Given the understanding of facts on the ground in Iran and the context of political factors affecting Iranian choices, it is possible to consider a set of three broad courses of action available to the United States in dealing with Iran. These are preemptive military options, patient noninterference, and rapprochement through trade.

Historical development of the relations between US and Iran Current relations between America and Iran can only be understood by looking at the history of the two countries, and the development of relations between them over time. "Contained in that history are all of the elements of our current impasse. Most Iranians know that history - or some warped version of it - too well.

Most Americans know too little that much of the ferocious hatred each side reserves for the other was born from the pain each has felt at different times when they believed they had been betrayed - jilted may be a more appropriate term - by the other." It is therefore important to look at the recent and distant past in order to understand and develop comprehensive policy choices. In particular it is notable that the relationship between the United States and Iran has been on bad terms for more than 25 years. Factors that need to be considered in order to understand those relations are as much historical, psychological, and cultural as they are influenced by national interests. Weighing these considerations it is possible to consider that the perception on both parts is mainly based on a process of mutual demonization. What are the key events shaping US-Iranian relations and perceptions? 1- Mossadeq Coup 1953 The frictions started with the creation of a marionette government, which was not liked by the Iranians because of its cruelty. When this regime was finally brought down by a popular revolution, the U.S. was mystified by the leaders of that uprising for the long years of despair. The irony is that America was just the latest nation that had treated Iran like a colony, but that experience is the most painful in the nation's memory.

At the height of the Cold War the Eisenhower administration was worried about an eventual Communist takeover and the nationalist aspirations of Mossadeq, which triggered a British-American operation to overthrow Mossadeq. Although the military coup seemed to fail first, after widespread rioting and with the help from the CIA and British intelligence services, Mossadeq was defeated and General Fazlollah Zahedi, who led the military coup, became prime minister and the shah returned to power. In the eyes of America and Great Britain, this countered the threat of Communist expansion and ensured support for Western oil interests. It was only in 2000 that the last major pieces surfaced to explain America's and Britain's roles in the Mossadeq coup, but the National Security Archives are still fighting for disclosure of documentation that remains locked. This material made clear that the CIA state-managed the entire coup not only carrying it out but also preparing the groundwork for it by subordinating various important Iranian political actors and using propaganda and other instruments to influence public opinion against Mossadeq. This change in public opinion was gained with money as well as with violence. 2- Hostage crisis 1979 - 1981 Despite the objections of Iran's revolutionary government, the United States allowed the Shah to enter the country in October 1979. On November 4, 1979, revolutionary students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, taking 66 of the U.S. staff hostage and demanding that the U.S. send the Shah back to Iran so that he could stand trial. Thousands of protestors around the Embassy support the calls of Ayatollah Khomeini to oppose American and Israeli interests. Thirteen of the hostages were released, as was the vice consul later who fell sick; the remaining 52 were captured for 444 days. After intense months of negotiations, the remaining hostages were released, interestingly enough just minutes after Ronald Reagan was sworn in as U.S. President on January 20, 1981. They were celebrated when they returned home.

The crisis also gave Reagan a massive boost at the beginning of his presidency. Nevertheless, after the euphoria had died down, uncomfortable questions arose that have never been fully answered. Critics still believe that Reagan's campaign team conspired to postpone the hostages' release until after the 1980 election to prevent it from helping Carter return to office. Today U.S. actions are clearly pushing Iran's national-interest calculus in the wrong direction. If Iran believes the United States will behave towards it as it has in the past, then it is in its interests to try to weaken the United States in Iraq and get ready for war. If war with America seems inevitable, then Iran would be better off facing a U.S. adversary now, while it is weakened by the Iraq imbroglio.

If, on the other hand, Iran believes that Washington wants to change direction, abandon interference in internal Iranian affairs and promote freedom and self-determination, then it is in Iran's interests to work toward stability in Iraq and pursue collaboration with the United States. It is President Bush's choice. His actions have indicated that he wants war. The United States has deployed its forces over 6,000 miles to surround and threaten Iran from Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, some former Soviet republics from the north and from an ever-increasing armada in the Persian Gulf. It is waging a colonial-style war on Iran's border in Iraq. The United States tolerates a nuclear-armed Pakistan, embraces a nuclear-armed India and does not mention that Israel is nuclear-armed; but it bullies Iran to forego what its leadership claims to be peaceful enrichment, and Washington will not even talk with Tehran unless it first suspends that enrichment. Meanwhile, Washington continues to back pliant and "moderate" Arab dictators.

Iran sees a United States that has not adhered to the rule of law, reserves the right to overthrow regimes, does not follow the Geneva Convention, has been belligerent toward Iran and now surrounds the country on all sides-can anyone blame ordinary Iranians for feeling insecure? Further, over a span of fifty years the United States has overthrown one of Iran's constitutionally elected governments; gave enthusiastic support to the oppressive, Shah-led government in Iran; and backed a madman that killed over 500,000 Iranians. That madman, otherwise known as the late Saddam Hussein, was used as foil against Iran after the revolution, due to the perception that Iran threatened the Al-Sauds (favored U.S. clients) and could roll-back America's Persian-Gulf hegemony. For decades there was no concern for the human rights of the Shi‘a majority in Iraq. The West and the United Nations acquiesced to Saddam's trashing of the rule of law and undermining of international treaties and failed to condemn him for his atrocities and use of Western-supplied biological and chemical weapons. When Saddam Hussein was no longer useful, the United States and its partners invaded the sovereign nation of Iraq-ultimately resulting in a mess that is now conveniently blamed on Iraqis, most recently Shi‘a Iraqis, and on Iranian intervention.

A war with Iran will further solidify the rule of the mullahs in Tehran and stoke further animosity towards the United States and towards America's so-called Arab "moderate regimes" in the Muslim world. If Mr. Bush truly wants to serve U.S. interests he could try putting hubris aside and learn statesmanship from Nelson Mandela and his efforts at reconciliation in South Africa. After years of foreign interference and regional conflicts, the West needs to adopt humility and contrition if it wishes to bridge the chasms it has created in the region.

At a minimum, the United States needs to understand Iran, in order to determine how to pursue dialogue and avoid a war. Should Bush decide to change direction and support pluralism and regional peace, then he has nothing to worry about. Announce the new goal. Show remorse for past actions. Change directions. Iran will stand down. And Mr. Bush is right about one thing: an immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces would result in more death and hardship in Iraq. But so will the continued U.S. presence, in its current posture.