The French Revolution, Napoleon’s rise in Europe, and the enthronement of his brother Joseph Bonaparte in Spain had far-reaching effects in Spain’s western hemisphere colonies. First, the principles of the French Revolution, following closely on the American Revolution, established in Central and South America a movement to break away from the power of Spain’s monarchy. Unfortunately, the goals of the colonial population differed depending on socioeconomic status. The lower classes and slaves looked forward to liberty, equality, and fraternity as preached by the French Revolution, but the upper class creoles (ethnic Spaniards born in the Americas) desired only the removal of royal power without a major social upheaval. When Joseph Bonaparte ascended the Spanish throne in 1808 and the reigning monarch Ferdinand VII was imprisoned, the resulting revolution in Spain against the foreign ruler was soon duplicated in Spain’s colonies. While some of the Latin American cities and provinces maintained their loyalty to Spain, many of the others only gave lip service to restoring Ferdinand to the throne. They were more intent on declaring independence from all of Europe, not just from the usurper Bonaparte.

While the Bonapartes ruled, the Latin American colonies began exercising their own political will, but the conflict between creoles and the lower classes meant that stable governments were not always established. Thus, when Ferdinand was restored to power in 1813 in the wake of British victories in Spain, Latin America had few populations that could mount a united effort against Spain’s attempt to reestablish colonial authority. A few cities remained loyal to Spain, but these became the targets of South America’s “Liberator,” Simon Bolívar, and his revolutionary associates. Thus, a three-way struggle among Spaniards, creoles, and the mixed race/Indian populations ensued. During the interregnum the viceroyalty of New Granada (modern Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and northern Peru) had declared itself the United Provinces of New Granada. Bolívar had aided in the removal of Spanish authorities in the capital city of Bogotá, but when he learned a Spanish expedition was sailing to reassert Ferdinand’s authority he abandoned the squabbling factions and fled for Jamaica, from where he planned the next phase of the revolution.

Ferdinand’s reconquest began in Venezuela in early 1815. He sent a force of veterans from the campaigns against the French under the command of General Pablo Morillo. Morillo quickly relieved the pro-Spanish coastal city of Santa Marta, then began pushing southwest down the coast toward the major port of Cartagena. With that city in hand, he would have a major base for supply and reinforcement for his campaign to recapture Bogotá. His force numbered approximately 8,000 Spanish soldiers and 3,000 Venezuelan Royalists. Morillo’s force sailed into sight of Cartagena on 18 August and two days later landed at the village of Puntacanoa.

Cartagena was originally established in 1533. The site was one of the largest harbors in South America, sufficiently large “that in Colonial days it was said that all the fleets of the world could find anchorage there” (Whyte, Seven Treasure Cities, p. 73). The only serious drawback to the location was an absolute absence of a supply of drinking water; the construction of cisterns in the city walls sufficed until the early twentieth century. The site became one of the terminals of the Spanish treasure fleets that removed the plunder of the Americas back to Spain. For that reason, it soon became the target of invaders.

The first was the French pirate Robert Baal in 1544. The wooden palisades originally constructed to defend against Indians began to be replaced by stone. After Sir Francis Drake captured and looted the city in 1585, more serious work began on the strengthening of stone walls and forts. The fortifications were only completed, however, after yet another sack of the city by the French Baron de Pointe in 1695. The fortifications completed in the early eighteenth century were sufficient to withstand a major assault in 1741 by British naval forces under Admiral Edward Vernon. That victory gave the local population the confidence in their defenses and in themselves that motivated them in the face of Morillo’s approach.

When, on 4 August 1815, news of Morillo’s capture of Santa Marta arrived in Cartagena, the city swung into action. General Manuel del Castillo took command of the city, established martial law, and called into service all able males between the ages of sixteen and fifty. This brought the defense to a strength of 3,700 men, over one-sixth the city’s population. Nearby towns and haciendas were burned to deny their cover and resources to the attackers. The citizens donated their wealth for the cost of defense, and many of the treasures of the Church were melted down for their silver and gold. The defenders possessed sixty-six cannon, and these were placed in various locations: on the high ground of La Popa, the castle of San Felipe, the fort of Santa Catalina, and Fort Bocachica. In addition, armed rafts, canoes, and ships prepared to defend the harbor.

General Morillo commanded infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers, along with a naval contingent of a man-of-war, two frigates, and other minor vessels. Morillo was a veteran, well known for his bravery and intelligence, but not for his diplomacy. “If a superior military mind, intrepid valor, and steadiness in the enterprise confided to him had been sufficient qualifications, no doubt Morillo would have satisfied the monarch’s intention…. The mission to be accomplished was of a different character: it was the reconciliation of discontented subjects with their sovereign, and for this Morillo was evidently not the man” (Hennau and Arrubla, History of Colombia, p. 270). Neither was this condition met in Morillo’s choice to command a Royalist Venezuelan contingent of 3,500: Brigadier Francisco Morales, known to the region as “the terror of the Americans.”

Morillo kept his ships at the entrances to the harbor rather than confront the maritime defenses, while his army proceeded to cut Cartagena off from outside aid. The fighting was relatively light, but the condition of the besieged gradually worsened. After a failed attempt to break through the blockade, General Castillo was removed from command on 17 October and replaced by General Francisco Bermudez. Later that month the Spanish began a regular bombardment of the city with good effect. On 11 November, the fourth anniversary of the city’s declaration of independence, Morillo tried to take advantage of the city’s celebration. In the darkness he pushed 800 men up the slopes of La Popa, but in the ensuing hand-to-hand combat the 200 defenders pushed the attackers back down the slope. A coordinated assault against Fort Angel was also unsuccessful, but the Spanish were able to force some ships into the harbor. They established a battery on Tierrabomba Island that increased the artillery pressure on the city. Morillo burned anything that might be of use to smugglers taking supplies to the city, then killed all the island’s inhabitants.

Even without direct assaults on the city, the blockade was sufficient to do the besiegers’ work. The city officials had refused to expel noncombatants, and the city population (swelled by the fleeing neighborhood farmers) proved too great a drain on the city’s resources. Death came to the defenders through both starvation and the diseases it caused. The inhabitants began eating anything and everything: “Rotten meat and flour, rancid codfish, horses, mules, burros, dogs, rats, and skins were the diet of the majority…. Foreign speculators profiteered without mercy, exchanging hidden deposits of food for the jewelry which was in the city” (Henao and Arrubula, History of Colombia, p. 272). Soldiers and civilians alike died, both sharing the same privations.

Weakness meant that the increasing number of dying could not be buried, spreading disease even more quickly. Dead bodies lay everywhere. Fear of Spanish retribution kept most from surrender until late November, when desperation forced some 2,000 to risk the consequences. The besiegers were so shocked at the condition of those surrendering that they punished none of them. One of the city leaders proposed sending the civilian population out, then setting off the city’s powder magazines as the Spanish entered the city. “Thus would be ‘sealed’ the immortality of a people, who, like the inhabitants of Numantia, had been invincible in defense and sublime in death” (Henao and Arrubula, History of Colombia, p. 273). On 5 December, Morillo offered the king’s clemency, but those with enough strength to flee tried to make their escape by sea. They spiked their cannon and took to their boats, but storms and Spaniards took their toll and no more than 600 reached freedom in the Antilles.

Morillo’s forces entered Cartagena on 6 December, after 106 days of siege. The city, numbering at the outset approximately 15,000 people, had been reduced by sickness, starvation, and combat to half that number. Morillo decided that the king’s clemency would be to execute another 4,700. The Spanish force during the siege had suffered some 3,000 deaths and an equal number sick.

King Ferdinand ordered a thanksgiving Mass celebrated to honor the capture of the city, and General Morillos was promoted to Count of Cartagena. The Inquisition, dismantled at the declaration of independence, was quickly reestablished. Although Spain once again ruled the city, the occupation was relatively brief. The tides of revolution had swept over too much of South America for Spain to reassume control, and rebel forces recaptured Cartagena in 1821. By then Spanish rule was collapsing through-out the hemisphere, and all of Latin America broke free with the exception of Puerto Rico and Cuba. Morillo’s occupation of Cartagena proved to be one of the few successes of Spain’s attempted reconsolidation of power.