Declaration of Exploitation: Should College Athletes Be Paid?

Declaration of Exploitation:

Why the NCAA Has Bamboozled Athletes and How It Can Be Fixed

Preamble

The model of professional sports has demonstrated that franchise owners compensate professional athletes with high salaries because these athletes generate great amounts of revenue (Camp 6). If Alex Rodriguez could not potentially generate at least 25 million dollars of potential revenue per year, then it would constitute financial suicide to compensate him as such. Yet we find out that the generous benefits for being an employee of a professional sports franchise do not necessarily parallel other industries. Often, companies will under-compensate those revenue sources most crucial to profit-making. It is well-documented that some of the richest corporations in the world exploit labor sources by paying minimum wage despite making significant profits. For example, many have accused Nike, an American shoe and apparel company, of exploiting third-world labor sources in order to minimize the cost of production and maximize profits (Ballinger 34). Many corporations have had to face similar allegations: Wal-Mart, Starbucks, Coca-Cola, to name a few. We have also found this to be the case in antiquity: the backlash against African-American slavery in the 17th-19th century, against sharecropping in the 20th century, and against migrant farm workers also highlight cases in which profitable entities reap benefits by exploiting the labor of their workers. Yet I wish to point attention to a different kind of exploitation currently prevalent in the United States: The NCAA. The National Collegiate Athletic Association has inconspicuously been exploiting collegiate athletes for over 60 years--- mainly those athletes who participate in the “revenue-generating” sports: basketball and football. The NCAA attempts to absolve itself from accountability by maintaining the notion of “amateur integrity”. Yet, as I will demonstrate, the current landscape of college athletics seemingly contradicts this integrity. I, for one, will not stand for it. I am here to issue a challenge to the NCAA, to end the blatant exploitation of these athletes. Either the NCAA must acknowledge itself as a business, in which case its athletes must be compensated fairly; or, it must maintain the true integrity of its stated ideals by discontinuing athletic scholarships.

Recruiting Wars and Graduation Rates

Every year, over 300 separate colleges and universities compete against each other to enhance their “product”. For the most part, they all pursue the same pool of athletic talent. Programs will often go to great lengths to convince elite recruits to attend their institutions. Charter flights, lavish dinners, exposure to college parties, and personalized jerseys are a few of the many tactics used to lure these elite recruits. These tactics have been abused to such an extent that in 2005 the NCAA enacted certain policies that limit the expenses of recruiting visits, for example: making recruits fly on commercial flights; offering standard room and board for recruits and their families; and avoiding the use of personalized recruiting ads (Recruitment and Retention, 7).

However, college recruiting has become such that athletic potential is often celebrated over academic potential. Why? For every coach that hesitates to sign a player because of a poor academic record, there exists another coach who will sign the player despite it. In this way, high academic standards become a hindrance in the recruiting process. For example, in 2003, the NCAA passed a resolution that allowed programs to recruit students who scored 400 or above on SAT tests (which, incidentally, is the lowest possible score); before this resolution was passed, the standard was 700; the national average for all test-takers is 800. (Farrey). There may be possible explanations for exceptionally low test scores, but any college institution, at best, would greatly hesitate to admit a student who scored so low on a standardized test. These new resolutions possibly demonstrate a low standard for athletes. College institutions seem to be bestowing scholarships on those student-athletes who are unlikely to succeed academically at the college level.

It all boils down to one major consideration--- money. Though institutions will most likely refuse to admit that athletic performance has little effect on the retention of scholarships, performance in fact has everything to do with these scholarships. Brigham Young University professor Steve Murphy, in his article “A Plan for Compensating Student Athletes” writes, “Scholarships are not altruistic and benevolent gifts of money to athletes. If an athlete fails to perform and play up to expectations, the scholarship is lost. This is not due to academic failure but because potential earnings for the school have faltered” (168). If however, an athlete barely stays above academic probation, yet continues to succeed on the field or court, the question of whether or not the scholarship is justified is never raised. Consider this: According to the University of Central Florida’s Institute for Diversity and Ethics in Sport, the 2006 NCAA men’s basketball tournament comprised of 34 institutions which failed to graduate 50% of their players in a 6 year span. Furthermore, 16 institutions failed to even graduate 40% of their student-athletes. Given that the national graduation rate for all students in 2006 was 56%, it seems many of the elite men’s basketball programs graduate athletes at a substantially lower rate. This is also the case in college football: In 2005, of the 56 teams competing in postseason bowl games, 11 failed to graduate at least 50% of their players.

If the NCAA, as its mission indicates, is in the business of molding excellent student-athletes, then recent graduation rates must be a cause for alarm. If, however, the NCAA and its member institutions merely hope to recruit potential revenue sources then, as a legitimate profit-making business, these sources’ compensation must be directly proportional to the revenue generated. It has become quite evident that in many instances the latter definition prevails. This practice of recruiting for potential revenue rather than for academic potential highlights the fact that the NCAA and its many of member schools are a serious business.

The Amateur Status of Student-Athletes

The now famous opening line of the NCAA constitution reads like this: “An amateur sportsman is one who engages in sports for the physical, mental, or social benefits he derives therefrom. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes shall be protected from exploitation from professional and commercial enterprises” (Article 2.9).

During the course of the NCAA’s history, dramatic and often tyrannical measures have been taken to enforce the notion of amateur eligibility. This perhaps archaic notion of amateurism, in fact, has been the NCAA’s main motivation for refusing to compensate student-athletes. However, the history of college athletics, despite the big brother nature of the NCAA administration, is rife with corrupt recruiting practices and illegal payment scandals. NCAA bylaws on amateurism are often so unforgiving and so stringent that most athletes and coaches do not recognize what constitutes acceptable behavior and what does not. Consider, for example, the case of former Colorado football player and national skier Jeremy Bloom, whose football eligibility was taken away due to the fact that he did ski endorsements. Student- athletes, by NCAA regulations, are not permitted to endorse products, as that constitutes “remuneration” for their athletic services (12.5.3). Never mind that the sport that Bloom endorsed for was not even an NCAA sport; the NCAA makes no exceptions. Consider also former University of Utah men’s basketball coach Rick Majerus, who, despite producing the most Academic All-Americans of any university in the 1990’s, was cited for providing improper benefits to his players. Among the transgressions: A dinner at a deli for a former player whose father had just died; buying a bagel for another player who had come to talk about his brother’s recent suicide; purchasing milk and cookies for his team to eat at film sessions; and allowing assistant coaches to buy $20 worth of groceries for two players who could not afford to eat because their university meal plans hadn’t begun yet. If the case of Majerus does not highlight the utter banality of NCAA amateur bylaws, consider the case of former University of Oklahoma third baseman Aaron Adair. Adair, who had recently survived brain cancer, wrote a motivational book about his fight with the disease. His eligibility was summarily revoked (Reilly)

The hypocrisy of the NCAA becomes glaring given that most Division I and II colleges violate the very first premise upon which the NCAA constitution is built; that student athletes not be compensated for their athletic talents. This reasoning seems wholly inconsistent with the fact that these colleges distribute athletic scholarships for those students who demonstrate superior competency in sports. What are scholarships but a form of compensation? Murphy outlines this hypocrisy when he makes a comparison between a student-athlete and a regular student. Suppose an English student were to pen a best-selling novel; there are no restrictions on the profits this student may receive from book sales. (170) Why, then, must the football or basketball star be prohibited from using his or her talent to make a profit?

It is perhaps a most ironic revelation that despite bylaws prohibiting endorsements by student-athletes, the NCAA and other businesses will gladly endorse their products by using video and even live likenesses of the NCAA’s most famous stars. Consider EA Sports’ NCAA video game franchise. Adorned on the NCAA Football 2007 cover is a likeness of University of Southern California tailback Reggie Bush; it is, in fact, a photograph picture of Bush. I have also found, dating back to the game’s inception in 1998, every cover was adorned by the most recognizable college athletes from the season before. EA Sports, as well as the NCAA, preserve the amateur status of every athlete in the game by withholding the use of specific, individual names. Not only does this action preserve the “integrity” of amateurism, it also serves an ulterior motive: it allows EA Sports to market and profit from the game without compensating the athletes in it. This would not be so dishonest if not for the fact that each player’s likeness and attributes are still preserved in the game; the uniform numbers all correspond to the correct likeness. Without the names, however, EA Sports can legally withhold any compensation for the players. Such is also the case with the company’s NCAA March Madness video game franchise. So then, this marketing strategy does not merely become a case of consumers wanting to see certain schools; certain individual student-athletes are what will drive the profits. What does this say, then, about how the NCAA and other media organizations utilize the talents of these individuals? Is it fair for these organizations to make a profit from these players if the players receive nothing in return? The most likely, and perhaps only, reasonable contention to this question is that athletes are being compensated, in the form of a scholarship (Murphy 170).

Are Scholarships Enough?

Despite the NCAA’s assertion that scholarships are sufficient compensation for the services of student athletes, scholarships rarely, if ever, provide a sufficient living for these student athletes. First, a full scholarship does not necessarily entail that everything is paid for. As Murphy also points out, scholarships do not necessarily cover the full cost of attendance, often including books, food, and other incidental expenses (171). As seen in the case of the University of Utah basketball players (this also is a problem exemplified in a significant majority of college athletic programs around the country), student-athletes often cannot afford these extra expenses. Second, all scholarships are not created equal or proportionate. Different institutions value scholarships differently. A full Notre Dame scholarship, given the cost of tuition, is about $46,000. A scholarship at a state school, meanwhile, costs significantly less. This would indicate that a scholarship athlete at Ohio State, where the tuition is around $17,000, is compensated less than one at Notre Dame, even if these two players are of equal ability. Furthermore, the last man off the bench for the Florida Gators basketball team, given the logic of scholarship compensation, is worth as much to the school as Joakim Noah, the team’s best and most recognizable player. This is simply not the case (Murphy, 169).

Perhaps we should take a look into the revenues of college athletics to determine whether a scholarship is really enough compensation for an elite “student-athlete”. Ohio State Buckeyes basketball center Greg Oden is an imposing figure. Standing at 7 feet, 260 pounds, Oden is almost unanimously regarded as the best center prospect to enter the college ranks in the last 20 years. In fact, if it were not for a new NBA rule prohibiting high schoolers from entering the draft, Oden might have skipped out on college altogether. Having recently completed his freshman season, Oden certainly did not fail to disappoint. His mere presence means much more revenue to the Ohio State athletic department. The exact figures are difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint. However, Oden’s presence has led to an exponential increase in Buckeye games on national television; led to sellouts at every Buckeye home game; as well as creating a larger market for Buckeye basketball merchandise. Leading his team to the NCAA tournament title game, Oden ( he also had much help from his teammates, but he shouldered an extremely heavy load) most likely secured multiple nationally televised games for next season, as well as more season ticket packages, a season in which he most likely will not even be a student at the university. His profit potential essentially allowed the NCAA to put a “face” on its “product” and market the “product” more successfully. There is no telling how much extra revenue Oden generated for those other companies: CBS, EA Sports, et al.

For all of his great work and dedication to Ohio State University, Oden is rewarded with a full athletic scholarship which allows him to attend the university free of charge. Consider this: The “typical” cost for all fees at the University amounts to about $17,000 ( HYPERLINK "http://www.osu.edu" Ohio State University) So, for the purposes of compensation, Ohio State offered an education worth $17,000 to a player that generated perhaps millions of dollars in extra revenue for the athletic department, and subsequently, the university. At the most conservative of estimates, let us hypothesize that Oden was, by his presence alone, worth 2 million dollars in extra revenue. $17,000 is about 0.85% of that revenue. Oden has thus been compensated with less than 1% of the extra revenue he generated for the university. Business ethicists around the world are all screaming in horror.

This is not just a case of Greg Oden being exploited by Ohio State and other businesses to make money. This is the case of many elite-level athletes in the “revenue sports”: They generate millions of dollars of extra revenue, yet they are compensated with so little in comparison to what they generate. And because of NCAA regulations, these problems continue to occur. Perhaps this calls for the best athletes to be compensated more than other athletes. This solution, however, cries of injustice--- what of the other men and women who have worked just as hard as Oden to represent the school through athletics? Perhaps this calls for a mandatory, egalitarian stipend for all college athletes. This solution, however, will elucidate cries of injustice when the non student-athletes and other academic departments ask for their fair share of the money. Either student-athletes will be paid, which will cause great unrest among the academic apologists; or they will not be paid, which will propagate a grave injustice against athletes. Thus, we have a conundrum.

The NCAA supposedly strives to protect the notion of amateurism, yet at this point in time this notion has been adapted and manipulated to such an extent that it is almost unrecognizable. There is simply no way to find a solution to the contradiction between college athletics and pure amateurism, given the way the business operates. Yet there is still a solution, if the NCAA wishes to make a business sacrifice and maintain the integrity of the term, “student-athlete”: Discontinue all athletic scholarships.

The Last Amateurs

Holding true to the mission of the NCAA bylaws, the Patriot League embraces athletic excellence alongside academic excellence rather than choosing one or the other. Comprised of eight member schools (American, Bucknell, Lehigh, Colgate, Army, Navy, Lafayette, and Holy Cross), the Patriot League was founded in 1986, grounded in the principle of molding excellent student-athletes. Only in recent years have most Patriot League schools awarded limited athletic scholarships (this, however, has most likely come as a result of the League’s inability to compete with scholarship programs). According to Joanna Kreps, the associate executive director of the Patriot League, prospective students who wish to play a varsity sport are held to the same admission standards as those students who are non-athletes. She says,

“Each incoming student-athlete must be admitted through the normal admissions procedure and must demonstrate a "representative" standard compared to the rest of the students in their entering class. We refer to this "representative" standard as the "Academic Index," and each incoming class is reported to and monitored by the League by several standing committees, including admissions and financial aid directors and the Policy Committee. The "Academic Index" is taken very seriously and ultimately ensures that the high academic standards of each institution are upheld across the board.”

By implementing this system, the Patriot League hopes to ensure that athletic excellence does not come at the expense of academic excellence. This system strives to uphold the academic integrity that many big-time programs have not made an effort to uphold. It corrects potential corruption in two ways: One, by refusing to admit any student-athlete who fails to perform to relatively high academic standards, the Patriot League gains more student-athletes who, because of their academic track record, are more likely to attend class and to graduate on time. Therefore, it is no surprise that the league has the highest graduation rates of any league in the country--- it is bound to attract those athletes who are more academically motivated. Second, the system combats the intense recruiting wars that have come to define the landscape of college sports. That is to say, by narrowing down the potential pool of players to those of the highest academic quality, and by making these recruits pay their way for college, there exists little incentive for lavish recruiting tactics.

However, as a necessary consequence, very few elite athletes would consider such an opportunity, given that they may receive offers from elsewhere where the cost of attendance is fully paid for. For those recruits who think little of academics, and instead view college sports as a stepping-stone for a professional career, there is little incentive to attend an institution where academic performance is so closely monitored.

As a consequence of this system, we find that very few elite athletes will choose to attend a university in the Patriot League. The cost (high academic standards coupled with normal tuition rates) dissuades the potential benefits for recruits (a prestigious education). Simply put, given the opportunity, elite athletes will choose to go where the money is. However, by upholding high academic standards, Patriot League schools invariably lower athletic standards, and thus the quality of play is greatly affected. This is quite evident after examining that the Patriot League has never had a single digit seed in the NCAA men’s basketball tournament ( basketball is the only league “revenue” sport that competes in Division I), and only one team has ever advanced beyond the first round in the league’s history (Pinnacle Sports) . Furthermore, Kreps says, “It is always difficult to financially compete with the "big-time programs," most especially in terms of facilities, staffing and operating budgets. However, in all of our discussions about being athletically competitive [with big-time schools] our primary purpose remains to embrace the student-athlete.” This seems an archaic, perhaps naïve intention in terms of the modern NCAA. If big-time programs are any indication, the process of becoming athletically competitive has exploited the concept of “student-athlete”, in such a way that what remains is merely the latter word.

It also seems that implementing a plan similar to the Patriot League would be met with great resistance to big-time athletic programs. By discontinuing athletic scholarships, and holding student-athletes to appropriate academic standards, many elite athletes may forgo college and instead attempt to compete in overseas professional leagues. This affects the quality of play and furthermore reduces potential revenue for schools. Such a plan also seems counterintuitive: How would it solve the problem of the under-compensation of student-athletes? Why take away the compensation they do have and make it nothing? Kreps perhaps hinted at a very important point regarding this issue. When I asked her about whether it was fair for Greg Oden to be compensated very little, she said, “Greg is a student; an amateur that chose to be an amateur to receive an education from Ohio State.” Kreps essentially means that student-athletes are under-compensated at their own free will.

This conclusion certainly renders itself invalid when we consider that in large part, a major consideration for how athletes choose to attend college is how they are compensated. It appears self-evident that a recruit will be more likely to attend a school where his/her education is paid for rather than one where it is not. However, by removing athletic scholarships, the NCAA would also be rendering this major consideration pointless. It would put schools on a more even financial level. For instance, given the federal qualifications for student aid, an expensive college would not be considerably more difficult to attend than a less expensive state college for a student-athlete in real financial need. This system might also have the potential for a cultural paradigm shift: those athletes who previously relied purely on their athletic talents in order to attend college might pay more attention to developing their academic talents as an alternative. Therefore, this would give Krep’s point more validity. In such a hypothetical system, an amateur will be one who chooses to be so; because there are no extraneous financial considerations, the amateur’s choice will be in no way determined by potential athletic scholarship compensation. It would be such that the athlete will be more likely to consider the education, rather than the team.

Postscript

In an ideal world, where politicians wouldn’t lie, and all would have health care, and student-athletes would be students first such a system would work perfectly. But this is not an ideal world. Politicians lie, many are without health care, and in many cases student-athletes in the NCAA are considered athletes first. It is highly unlikely that the member schools of the NCAA would adopt either measure: compensating student-athletes more might lead to greater corruption; and discontinuing athletic scholarships might reduce revenue figures. It simply is not beneficial to these schools to adopt such programs, although the Patriot League has proven that athletic success does not necessarily have to come at the expense of academic success. I propose this latter solution is indeed plausible; discontinuing athletic scholarships might perhaps lead to greater parity and thus a more competitive atmosphere within the college game. After all, it is perhaps competitive balance that leads to great revenue; most fans just want to see an exciting, closely played match-up. So the revenue loss might not be so great after all. However, as long as the NCAA fails to recognize such implications, the exploitation of student-athletes will continue. It is my hope that the NCAA finds a plausible solution to this problem, and to successfully implement it. To the NCAA: The ball is in your court.

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