Iran Revolt Update

I will note at the outset that I am not necessarily the most qualified authority to speak on this topic. What I am trying to accomplish, nonetheless, is to show support for the people of Iran and offer a concise breakdown of recent events in Iran. If the Iranian people can prove victorious in their struggle, then the entire world will benefit, even if only slightly.

I will no longer refer to Khamenei as “Ayatollah” nor to Ahmadinejad as “President”; they have willingly forsaken their rights to their titles as they have, by their actions, willingly surrendered their rights to membership in the human race. Like Stalin, they are willing to sacrifice multitudes of their own to maintain control and prosecute their political agenda.

I have continued to follow the news from Iran regarding the ongoing domestic political strife. The regime of Ahmadinejad and Khamenei has severely cracked down on all opposition, real and imagined. Foreign and independent news agencies have been effectively shuttered, with foreign journalists instructed to leave the country. Robert Fisk, of Britain’s The Independent, had been practicing a sort of guerilla journalism, remaining even after the order to leave. Fisk’s justification was that he had heard of the general order to depart but that no one had specifically instructed him personally to leave. He has published as of today, but I haven’t discerned whether he is still in-country. The government’s intention with ordering all foreign journalists out is obvious. The government of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad intends to gain control of everything to include the news consumed by both domestic and international audiences. This government has moved toward autocracy and totalitarianism, and desires to eliminate any but their official versions of the news.

The crackdowns have had a definite effect on the numbers attending what have now become anti-government protests. As of last Tuesday, 16 June, the protests had become a general call against the government and were no longer simply about the election. The rallies on 16 June took place despite Mousavi’s call to not demonstrate. Mir Mousavi attended upon realizing the number of those who had chosen to rally contrary to his instructions. As events progressed, even with smaller numbers attending rallies in the face of the threat by police and Basiji, a trend revealed itself. Starting on 13 June and going through 15 June, the protests were largely the work of students and the young. The protests of Monday, 15 June saw more Iranians of mature adulthood and middle age. The violent repression of the government has caused the representation of all factions within Iranian society to appear at rallies. By Saturday the 20^th, there were even mullahs, senior clerics of Islam, present in the crowds. This bodes well for the continuation of the unrest.

All political opponents to the Ahmadinejad regime have now either reversed themselves or are under effective house arrest. Conservative candidate Moshen Rezai has withdrawn his election complaint, according to an aide, because the Supreme Council never even bothered to start the limited vote recount it had promised. Communication for opposition leaders is severely restricted and consistently monitored. Still, they call for more demonstrations and mournings.

Although the government crackdown has been largely successful, it has not been entirely successful. There is hope, as the numbers of the disaffected swell with each new incident of government violence. The demographic base of the protest has been greatly enlarged, with even Revolutionary Guard and police commanders being arrested for refusing government orders. The expansion of sympathy among the Iranian population as a whole is critical to this protest becoming a revolution. In another positive note, there are murmurs on the internet of a possible compromise of either power-sharing or run-off between Mousavi and Ahmadinejad. At a Parliamentary party to celebrate Ahmadinejad’s “victory”, 185 of 290 Members of Parliament refused to attend.

Many comparisons to the Revolution of 1979 have been made; some are legitimate, some are not. Tellingly though, like the previous Revolution, this one has suffered initial setbacks which have expanded the demographic base. Also, some more moderate and even reformist mullahs have begun to participate. The ’79 Revolution experienced lulls in the action and fluctuations in attendance and took months to accomplish; this will not be resolved overnight.

It remains to be seen what all of this will mean, as it remains to be seen how this will be resolved. Interestingly, the changes Mousavi would have brought to Iran through a proper election would have been important from both an Iranian and world perspective, but those changes would not have been markedly significant. Now that this revolution has erupted, its success would almost certainly be both important and significant.

The prognosis for the situation is difficult to call; if the demonstrators can maintain their dedication and come up with better organization, they will succeed. Then again, the current regime has demonstrated that it is willing to do violence to anyone.