A month after Colenso, where General Sir Redvers Buller's infantry had been compelled to retreat leaving behind 10 artillery pieces, a new plan was afoot, that would take the battle out of the foothills and deep into the Drakensberg Mountains. Now reinforced (and rearmed), it was Buller's intention to move forty kilometres up the south bank of the Tugela River, cross the river, outflank the Boer defences and open the way to relieve the Siege of Ladysmith.

It was an ambitious plan. Just moving the 19 000 infantrymen, 3 000 cavalry and the 60 artillery pieces that he had at his disposal, not to mention the supplies, ammunition and everything else that must accompany an army on the move, was a considerable undertaking. Particularly given that such roads as there were had been substantially washed away because it had been raining heavily and every stream was a swollen torrent. And every step took them deeper into the mountains. He did it though.

A few lessons had been learned at Colenso. The British army was no longer dressed in its traditional "red coats". They were now in khaki. They no longer moved in tight military formations but in much looser structures. Rather than a simple frontal assault, this plan was more subtle.

Eight kilometres short of his intended crossing point there was another point that could be forded and Buller made a great show of setting up his artillery, establishing a bridge - all intended to concentrate the Boer forces in the wrong position. Then overnight he force-marched the bulk of the operation the further eight kilometers he wanted.

Well, give Buller credit for a masterpiece of operational and logistical planning. In fairly short order he'd established a bridgehead and got his troops, artillery and everything else, on the other side of the river. In the shadow of Spionkop.

Had they pressed on apace, this would have been a badly needed success story for the British Empire. But they didn't. They shilly-shallied for days. And the Boers were nothing if not mobile.

The problem was that rather formidable mountain - Spionkop ("Spy-Hill"). He who commanded Spionkop commanded everything. Buller knew that and his opposite number, Louis Botha, knew that too.

The British attacked the summit on a starless night. It's a steep winding path over broken ground. So it had to be done pretty much in single file. The Boers waited. Silently.

So what went wrong? Well, about a hundred metres below the summit of Spionkop there is a small plateau, no more than a few hundred metres in extent, which obscures the "real" summit from below. In the dark, the advancing British assumed they had reached the summit, found it deserted, and that the position had been won. Cheers and celebrations all round. Still the Boers were silent.

As the early-morning mist burned off a few rather grim realities started to sink in. Like Mauser bullets. Concentrated in a relatively small area, with little cover, in extremely rocky terrain, which made it impossible to "dig in", it was a terrible situation. The British artillery couldn't get a fix on a well-entrenched and invisible Boer position. The Boer artillery on the other hand, was pinpoint.

All credit to the heroism of the British troops. Throughout the day stretcher-bearers came down the mountain, and fresh troops went into the slaughter field - the "acre of massacre", as it became known.

Ironically, during the night British forces retired and, Louis Botha's men did the same. If Buller had held on for an hour or two, he'd have had command of the summit. When members of Louis Botha's commandos returned in the morning to reconnoitre the position, it was to find the pride of the British Empire moving back across the river.

Another bad day for England. Another bad day for Buller. Wait for round 3 - Vaalkranz.

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