World War II: The Invasion of Philippine Islands

^{source(s): THE PHILIPPINES A UNIQUE NATION by: Dr. Sonia M. Zaide}

The Japanese did not wait for the destruction of American air and naval forces to begin landings in the Philippine Archipelago. Hours before the first Japanese plane had taken off to attack targets in the Philippine Islands, three task forces had sailed south from Formosa ports under cover of darkness on the evening of 7 December (Tokyo time). Their destination was the Philippine Islands; two were to land on northern Luzon, and the third was headed for the tiny island of Batan about 150 miles to the north. The next day another task force left Palau and steamed toward Legaspi, near the southeast tip of Luzon. At the same time, a fifth task force, scheduled to seize Davao, the principal port in Mindanao, was assembling at Palau.

Altogether, the Japanese planned six advance landings: Batan Island, Aparri, Vigan, Legaspi, Davao, and Jolo Island. All but the last two were on or near Luzon and were designed to provide the Japanese with advance bases from which short-range fighters could attack the fields of the Far East Air Force and support the main landings to follow. A base at Legaspi, the Japanese believed, would, in addition to providing an airfield, give them control of San Bernardino Strait, between Luzon and Samar, and prevent the Americans from bringing in reinforcements. The landings at Davao and Jolo Island were designed to secure advance bases for a later move southward into the Netherlands Indies. The Japanese also, by landing in Mindanao, to isolate the Philippine Archipelago from Allied bases to he south and to cut the American route of withdrawal and supply.

The forces assigned to these landings were small, even for such limited objectives. But to secure so many detachments for the advance landings, General Homma had had to weaken seriously the two combat divisions Imperial General Headquarters had allotted to him for the Philippine invasion. Not one of the advance landing detachments was strong enough to withstand a determined counterattack; the largest was only about as large as a regiment, and the smallest was hardly stronger than a company. Moreover, the timetable for invasion was a complicated one and could easily be upset by any unexpected event.

It has been claimed that the preliminary landings were part of a clever Japanese scheme to draw the American forces toward widely separated points and then cut them off by later landings. There is no evidence for such a view. General Homma had no intention of drawing the American troops to the landing points and was not naive enough to hope to deceive the Americans by so obvious a ruse. Nor did he have the troops to spare for such an effort. The size of the forces assigned to the preliminary landings and the places selected for the landings revealed their true purpose almost immediately to the American Command.

"Japanese planes began their attack in the Philippines at 0530, 8 December 1941, sinking a sea plane tender off the coast of Mindanao. Six hours later, Formosa-based bombers attacked American bases on Luzon, destroying dozens of fighters and bomber planes at Clark, Nichols, Iba, and other air fields near Manila. Although warnings were received at Army Air Force headquarters at least forty-five minutes before the attack, nothing was done to evacuate. Japanese pilots found their targets parked like sitting ducks on the runways and, with no anti- aircraft fire to distract them."

"On December 10, the Japanese invaders made their first successful landing at Aparri and Vigan in Nothern Luzon two days later, more assault forces invading Legaspi and in Southern Luzon. In Davao the Japanese landed on December 20, few days later the main Japanese invasion forces under the command of Gen. Masaharu Homma, landed in Lingayen. Other landings took place at Atimonan and Mauban on December 29.

Enemy landings were hard to stop due to severe damaged in our Armed forces especially the Air force that had been destroyed on the first day of the attack.

While the invading Japanese were landed at various points of the archipelago, their planes were busy bombing the military objectives and the civilian evacuation centers. Capt. Jesus Villamor and two other Filipino pilots bravely engaged the raiders in battle. Villamor shot down one enemy plane. He was the first filipino to win fame in aerial combat. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross medal by General Macarthur.

On December 11, over Batangas airfield, Capt. Villamor and other Filipino airmen attacked two enemy squadrons of 27 planes each. Two Japanese planes were shot down during the dogfight, but Villamor lost two of his men."

Gen. Masaharu Homma-Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces.

The Japanese 14th Army, under General Masaharu Homma, began its invasion with a landing on Batan Island (not to be confused with Bataan), off the north coast of Luzon, on December 8, 1941. Landings on Camiguin Island and at Vigan, Aparri, and Gonzaga in northern Luzon followed two days later. Two B-17s attacked the Japanese ships offloading at Gonzaga. Other B-17s with fighter escort attacked the landings at Vigan. In this last coordinated action of the Far East Air Force, U.S. planes damaged two Japanese transports, the cruiser Naka, and the destroyer Murasame, and sank one minesweeper. Early on the morning of December 12, the Japanese landed 2,500 men of the 16th Division at Legazpi on southern Luzon, 150 miles (240 km) from the nearest American and Philippine forces. The attack on Mindanao followed on December 19. Meanwhile, Admiral Thomas C. Hart withdrew most of his U.S. Asiatic Fleet from Philippine waters following Japanese air strikes that inflicted heavy damage on U.S. naval facilities at Cavite on December 8. Only submarines were left to contest Japanese naval superiority.

The main attack began early on the morning of 22 December as the 43,110 men of General Homma's 14th Army entered Luzon's Lingayen Gulf. The 48th Division and elements of the 16th Division, with support from artillery and 80 to 100 tanks, landed at three points along the east coast of the gulf. A few B-17s flying from Australia attacked the invasion fleet, and U.S. submarines harassed it from the adjacent waters, but with little effect. General Wainwright's poorly trained and poorly equipped 11th and 71st Divisions (PA) could neither repel the landings nor pin the enemy on the beaches. The remaining Japanese units of the 48th and 16th Divisions landed farther south along the gulf. The 26th Cavalry (PS), advancing to meet them, put up a strong fight at Rosario but, after taking heavy casualties and with no hope of sufficient reinforcements, was forced to withdraw. By nightfall, December 23, the Japanese had moved ten miles (16 km) into the interior of the island. The next day 7,000 men of the 16th Division hit the beaches at three locations along the shore of Lamon Bay in southern Luzon where they found General Parker's forces dispersed and unable to offer serious resistance. They immediately consolidated their positions and began the drive north toward Manila where they would link up with the forces advancing south toward the capital for the final victory.

Most of the Allied forces surrendered or were overrun. The U.S. Philippine Division moved into the field to cover the withdrawal of troops to Bataan and to resist Japanese advances in the Subic Bay area. On December 26, MacArthur notified his field commanders that he was reactivating an old prewar plan to defend only Bataan and Corregidor; both the military headquarters and the Philippines government were moved there. Nevertheless substantial forces remained in other areas for several months.

On December 30, the Philippine 31st Infantry Division moved to the vicinity of Zigzag Pass to cover the flanks of troops withdrawing from central and southern Luzon, while the U.S. Philippine Division organized positions at Bataan. The 31st Division then moved to a defensive position on the west side of the Olongapo-Manila road, near Layac Junction — at the neck of Bataan Peninsula — on January 5, 1942. The junction was lost on January 6, but the withdrawal to Bataan was a relative success. The 31st Division assumed a reserve position on the peninsula to recover from its losses in the rearguard action.

Battle of Bataan

From January 7 to January 14, 1942, the Japanese concentrated on reconnaissance and preparations for an attack on the main battle position on the Abucay line. U.S. and Filipino forces repelled night attacks near Abucay, and elements of the U.S. Philippine Division counterattacked on January 16. This failed, and the division withdrew to a reserve position in the Casa Pilar–Bagac area on January 26.

For several weeks the Japanese, deterred by heavy losses, engaged in patrols and limited local attacks. Because of the worsening Allied position in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to re-locate from Corregidor to Australia, as Supreme Allied Commander South West Pacific Area. (MacArthur's famous speech regarding the Philippines, in which he said "I came out of Bataan and I shall return" was made at Terowie, South Australia on March 20.) Wainwright assumed control of Allied forces in the Philippines on March 12. During this period elements of the U.S. Philippine Division were shifted to assist in the defense of other sectors.

Beginning March 28, a new wave of Japanese attacks hit Allied forces who were severely weakened by malnutrition, sickness and prolonged fighting. On April 3, the Japanese began to break through along Mount Samat. The U.S. Philippine Division, no longer operating as a coordinated unit, was unable to counterattack against heavy enemy assaults. On April 8, the U.S. 57th Infantry Regiment (PS) and the Philippine 31st Division were overrun near the Alangan River. The U.S. 45th Infantry Regiment (PS) finally surrendered on April 10, 1942.

^{courtesy of wikipedia.com}