On de Beauvoir's Examination of Woman

"One wonders if women still exist," Simone de Beauvoir muses in her Introduction to The Second Sex, "if they will always exist, whether or not it is desirable that they should, what place they occupy in this world, what their place should be." Throughout feminist theory, there has evidently been a deep and searing divide between defining the category of “woman”. Should we deconstruct the predicate of woman, or should we build it up? In this paper I will outline de Beauvoir's ruminations on the concept of womanhood, and how she proposes that this concept be reexamined. I will then present two objections to de Beauvoir's argument, and examine whether these objections could be answered plausibly within her existentialist perspective.

De Beauvoir begins with an the obvious elementary question, "What is a woman?" Certainly, the category "woman" represents a broad subset of humanity, approximately 50%. But what is it that makes this half woman? We might intuitively consider woman biologically, as that which has a uterus. But de Beauvoir admits that "connoisseurs" do not declare every human with a uterus as a woman. "It would appear then," she writes, "that every female human being is not necessarily a woman; to be so considered she must share in that mysterious and threatened reality known as femininity." De Beauvoir thus rejects the view that having the reproductive system of a biological female means that such a female participates in womanhood. There must be something more, De Beauvoir believes, that links “women” together in a common experience, not necessarily equivalent to the experience of being “female”.

The search for what underlies the concept of "woman" may invariably lead to an essentialist definition. If we are to connect the category of "woman" across cultures and races, across space and time, then there must, it seems, be an invariable, unchangeable essence. Owing to de Beauvoir's earlier claims, this essence cannot be biological. But she further admits that both biology and social science have discounted the notion of such a fixed essence. At the same time, however, she refuses to accept to category as empty. She refutes the predominately American nominalist view, which seeks to destroy the category altogether, for, "the antifeminists have had no trouble in showing that women simply are not men." As the American feminist view might be to dismiss our notion of “womanhood” as a meaningless concept, De Beauvoir argues that the distinction between women and men is so clear and so obvious, that there must be some kind of meaning in the concept of womanhood. Thus, rather than trying to deconstruct the term “woman” altogether, it seems that De Beauvoir's project seems to be finding just what we mean when we say that a particular person is a “woman”.

These considerations aside (that woman cannot be defined in a strictly biological sense nor as an eternal essence), de Beauvoir then sets out on her own definition. The most important step in her methodology, perhaps, is an introspective consideration of the nature of her project. "A man never begins by presenting himself as an individual of a certain sex; it goes without saying that he is a man." Right away, de Beauvoir notices, in the very nature of being a woman, is a necessary separation from man. The first step in differentiating herself as a woman is acknowledging that she is embarking on a project particular to women, and unheard of for man. A man doesn't have to ask himself the question of what comprises his masculinity, because he is, as it were, the default gender. As de Beauvoir argues later, man has already defined himself, and thus he has already established his identity, whereas women have historically been defined against this definition of masculinity. Thus, the important project seems to be to positively establish what exactly it means to be a woman, rather than accepting this identity as one opposed to some default. This dichotomy sets the context for how she continues.

De Beauvoir compares woman and man to two electrical poles; man occupies the positive and negative poles (for example, in grammar, "man" is often the neutral, default designation) while woman represents only the negative pole, as an absence of man. Therefore, historically, "woman" has come to represent, in some sense, an absence of manhood.

"Thus," she writes, "humanity is male and man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being... He is the Subject, he is the Absolute--- she is the Other." What makes one a woman, de Beauvoir argues, is to participate in this "Otherness". It means to belong to the group of people set up as the other, whose identity is shaped by an absence of characteristics. As she points out, " The category of the Other is as primordial as consciousness itself.” That is to say, inherent in any primitive notion of being exists a duality of the essential and the inessential. She writes, “Thus it is that no group ever sets up as the One without at once setting up the other over against itself.” De Beauvoir echoes Hegel on this notion; in the very nature of consciousness is a “fundamental hostility” to every other form of consciousness; the subject can only come to define itself insofar as it defines a subject opposed to itself, as an inessential.

It has become clear for de Beauvoir that woman has been set up as the inessential by man, as an Other, but it still remains unclear why the balance of power is thus. Why have men become the essential, the dominant, category? Furthermore, why have women seemingly allowed their subjugation? It seems that both categories, fundamentally are equally capable of domination. Woman is not a minority category; she represents approximately half the human population. There is no reason to think that women wouldn't have been able to take the dominant role to define themselves as the essential as opposed to the masculine inessential. It seems, therefore, that the women have submitted themselves, in some way, under the domination of masculine forces.

This submission, de Beauvoir argues, could not have been caused by a historical event. Women have always existed, and have always existed as subordinate to men. Though one might argue that this is the nature of the relationship, de Beauvoir argues that “ The nature of things is no more immutably given, once for all, than is historical reality. If woman seems to be the inessential which never becomes the essential, it is because she herself fails to bring about this change.” She continues, “the woman's effort has never been anything more than a symbolic agitation. They have gained only what men have been willing to grant; they have taken nothing, they have only received.”

Women have failed to bring about this change because, as de Beauvoir writes, they have not organized themselves in the way that ethnic groups, for example, can. As a whole, they have nothing that binds them. They are attached to males more strongly than they are to their woman counterparts. In many ways, woman has become dependent on man for her very survival. But this dependence works the other way also. Woman, she writes, “is the Other in a totality of which the two components are necessary to one another.” Thus, woman and man have a symbiotic relationship. Woman depends upon man for her survival, and, conversely, man depends upon woman for his survival. Woman's failure to take on the dominant role rests in the failure to recognize and exploit this latter point. Interestingly, de Beauvoir seems to be slipping back to a biological explanation for womanhood. She has previously argued that woman is more than biology, yet, at the same time, posits a biological relationship between women and men as significant in the master/slave dialectic.

Man is dependent on woman, primarily, for two things--- sexual desire and the desire for offspring. Essentially, man is dependent upon woman for satisfaction. This desire for satisfaction is a primordial desire; thus man has and always will need such fulfillment. According to de Beauvoir, women must exploit this fact of nature, and claim their identity as equals. But women have been loathe to exploit this, because, in a sense, they have been afraid of giving up what they have already earned. They would give up their protection that man provides; the economic advantages that they have in virtue of men. Thus, it seems, there to certain gains to subordination, and de Beauvoir believes many women do not want to surrender these gains for a chance at even greater gains. “ There is also the temptation to forgo liberty and become a thing. This is an inauspicious road, for he who takes it--- passive, lost, ruined--- becomes henceforth the creature of another's will, frustrated in his transcendence and deprived of every value.” In other words, woman, having been subordinated as the inessential, is afraid to confront her own transcendence, for that represents a monumental sacrifice that she is entirely hesitant to make. It seems to be a dilemma of risking a fairly safe existence for a riskier chance at a more fulfilling existence.

De Beauvoir, as an existential philosopher, believes that woman can transcend her Otherness to claim the power she so rightfully deserves. However, her historiographical analysis of duality raises questions concerning her definition of woman. She certainly raises a valid point as she writes about the primordial quality of the duality, yet in some sense, she fails to account for why this specific duality--- namely, that of man/woman, is of the most significance. It would certainly be fair to say that de Beauvoir believes that this duality is the most primitive, base, and significant human duality. She writes, “In truth, to go for a walk with one's eyes open is enough to demonstrate that humanity is divided into two classes of individuals whose clothes, faces, bodies, smiles, gaits, interests, and occupations are manifestly different.”

First, we must examine the validity of her premise-- that humanity is divided into two classes of individuals. We can certainly sense this intuitively; however, owing to de Beauvoir's earlier statement that there is nothing that binds women to each other, could we classify them as a group? Can we classify the term woman as a primary descriptor of human classification? De Beauvoir admits that women are more tightly bound to other males than they are to other women; should we classify this as a consequence of their Otherness, or may we perhaps speculate that certain women attached to certain men create another dominant group posed against another group of women attached to men cast as the inessential? For example, can we ask if white women and men have, historically, posed themselves as the dominant group against non-white women and men as the Other? Or Western women and men as dominant and Eastern women and men as the Other? Aren't there beings who have the primary qualities of, for example, “black” and “woman” that claim the former, rather than the latter, as a primary property of existence? This would seem to relegate the primordial man/woman duality to secondary status. We can certainly admit that, for example, in the United States, some black women feel more oppressed by their blackness than their femininity. If so, it would seem to be the case that man/woman is not the duality we should be concerned about. Insofar as her Introduction to the Second Sex is concerned, de Beauvoir fails to give a convincing account for why the man/woman duality is of more significance than other dualities that may exist.

On the other hand, de Beauvoir's arguments for the uniqueness of the man/woman duality are strong. Man and woman are interdependent, interrelated, symbiotic groups that cannot exist without one another. As she mentioned earlier, there is a certain biological relationship between men and women (so, perhaps, she might not want to discard biology altogether as a descriptor of womanhood), such that this co-dependence is natural. The other dualities can conceivably be thought of as distinct and not dependent upon each other, but in the case of man and woman, they cannot be separated, which makes all the more significant and pressing the way in which man has asserted himself in the dominant role. It is true that, in a general sense, groups comprised of both women and men have asserted superiority over other groups of women and men. Yet, once we separate these groups, intra-group duality remains. For example, once we separate white men and women from black men and women, we still see the same pattern within these groups-- White man as essential vs. the white woman as inessential, and black man as the essential vs black woman as the inessential. De Beauvoir is certainly correct on this account, and thus, arguing against the objection I raised, establishes why the duality of man/woman is of special significance. Even if we go beyond groups established by race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, et. al, the man/woman binary seems to exists still within these groups, and thus, as de Beauvoir is doing, we must examine this particular relationship and why it pervades throughout all human populations.

Now that this duality has been established as significant, we must examine de Beauvoir's solution for woman to claim her essentiality, and thus her free agency in the world. As far as tools available at woman's disposal, de Beauvoir suggests that woman use men's natural desire for satisfaction against him. This would certainly an option; however, casting women in this light would, it seems, admit of their natural inferiority, and thus destroy her existentialist project. If there is no logical reason that woman shouldn't be any different than man, then why make mention of her desires (economic, security, etc.) any different from his desires (satisfaction)? Can social emancipation for women, as de Beauvoir argues, really result from an exploitation of man's desire for sex and offspring? Perhaps it is not entirely fair to suggest that de Beauvoir is advocating this as the only solution; she desires for women to step out of the master/slave dialectic and claim an “authentic existence”, but at the same time, seems to be suggesting that exploitation of the relationship would be a good start. Exploiting this need would certainly make man conscious of this need, and thus unable to secure it through his own action, but it also seems that this exploitation is selling the potentiality of women short. It is perhaps a novel way to begin a social emancipation, but not necessarily the best way. African-American slaves, for example, didn't socially emancipate themselves through their masters' economic need; if a slave attempted such tactics, he or she would be beaten, killed, or otherwise disposed of and easily replaced. Much in the same way, woman can be easily replaced by another woman who will give man what he wants. Thus, women could pursue a stronger emancipation by taking advantage of the economic, educational, or social opportunities presented to her, and proving her equality through those means; much like African-Americans essentiality proved their equality by taking advantage of the opportunities presented to them. And it seems, and de Beauvoir admits as much, that the 20th century saw significant gains in terms of opportunities for women . As more and more women are presented with equal opportunities, more and more women will be able to prove their equality and thus claim their essentiality as humans with significant potential.

This objection may fall to de Beauvoir's claim that women have taken nothing, they have only received. As seizing power is concerned, women can only take advantage of opportunities insofar as men are willing to grant them. Men won't voluntarily give up much. This is a valid response, yet an inadequate one. It is true that men won't voluntarily give up the power they have gained over women. Thus, the interesting question becomes not how to get them to give up these economic, educational, and social opportunities, but why they won't give them up. It is interesting to note, for instance, that many slave owners in colonial America used the inferiority claim to justify why African slaves should be subjugated under white control. Yet, at the same time, in almost every slave-owning society, one of the cardinal sins was to let slaves learn to read and write. Why such a fear if these were barbaric, primitive, inferior peoples? How could they possibly learn to read and write if they were so inferior? Thus, these rules arose not out of a superiority complex, but rather a complex of fear. A fear that, given equal educational opportunity, black slaves would eventually prove their equality as human beings. Much in the same way, we must ask ourselves why men, historically, have not allowed women the same right to such opportunities. Is it because of a superiority complex, or is is because man is afraid of woman asserting her power and potential? If so, can we justifiably make the claim that man truly views woman as the inessential, or merely wants to keep up the illusion of inessentiality? This, perhaps, is a sufficient tactic for women to seize power. Challenge man to provide her equal opportunities he grants his fellow men. If he won't grant it, women will have won the psychological battle and paved a path to this power; if he does grant it, woman will have the opportunity seize her equality outright.

In conclusion, de Beauvoir has painted a compelling portrait of woman as the Other. She has demonstrated why the man/woman duality is of significance, and why it is essential to examine woman not only in virtue of herself, but in virtue of relationship with man. Woman is not, as some might want to argue, a category that stands alone. It is a relative category, and thus must be resolved with an appropriate genealogy with respect to humanity. Woman is not necessarily what is now; but rather, a culmination of historical processes and attitudes-- what has been. Though this portrait is compelling, de Beauvoir at the same time underestimates woman's capacity to seize power. She seems to be advocating the seizure of power in virtue of man's need; while failing to realize that this power can be seized through virtue of woman's capabilities. The key to claiming oneself as an essential is to affirm oneself-- to define oneself in virtue of one's own power. To become a woman means to take advantage of opportunities and to affirm one's womanhood-- as strong, powerful, and equally transcendent as man has held his own self to be. De Beauvoir is certainly correct in this account, but she ultimately fails to go far enough.