Blame Pakistan If the Afghanistan War is Lost

Pakistan plays both sides and the sad thing is, the US intelligence knows it, yet, totally helpless to correct it.

Pakistan itself is corrupt, afraid to apply too much pressure on the Taliban for obvious reasons, takes billions from the US then placates the US with half-ass attempts to eradicate the enemy while pocketing billions, which, no doubt, ends up in Taliban hands from those within Pakistan military.

They prohibit American drones and soldiers to cross the open border to destroy the enemy because Pakistan wants them to have a "safe" haven because, in their hearts, they are islamic, muslim brothers. Pakistan's Army, General Kayani, has broken so many promises made to the US just to get more US aid, yet, we continue to provide the funds-wishful thinking.

Pakistan will do military attacks to placate the Americans so they continue to get US aid. They clear out areas, then leave, the Taliban return or allowed to remain there. Meanwhile, they cross the border to Afghanistan, kill Americans, and hop back into Pakistan.

Geez, what does this sound like?

Vietnam, maybe? The Taliban have learned their tactics. In Vietnam, the enemy forces were based in Laos or China. Their troops would cross into South Vietnam and attack and flee back into Laos, where US B-52s and air attacks were forbidden to attack much of the time. It was the B-52 attacks that would bring the enemy to their knees when it was allowed. This was proven over and over. 

History is repeating. The outcome will be the same and you can blame Pakistan as they spend our money.

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Hmrjmr1 profile image

Hmrjmr1 5 years ago from Georgia, USA

Perrya - on this issue we agree the Paki's are playing both sides and we need to force them to decide if they are with us or against us. One minor correction it was Cambodia and Laos that sheltered the Ho Chi Minh Trail and NVA Base Camps, while China provided most of the NVA Weapons, that were paid for by the Russians.


American Romance profile image

American Romance 5 years ago from America

Time to stop giving them money, but our govt wont listen, After a landslide election and the next bill on the table has billions in pork, we will continue to give millions to terrosist supporting nations as long as our metally challenged officials so desire! I will never get this!


perrya profile image

perrya 5 years ago Author

Yes, Obama has said the success in Afghanistan is fragile. This is a nice way to prepare the public for loss.


A,M.H 4 years ago

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Can't Win in Afghanistan? Blame Pakistan

by Eric Margolis

by Eric Margolis

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Soon after the US invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban government in 2001, I predicted that Taliban resistance would resume in four years.

My fellow pundits, who were cock-a-hoop over the US military victory over a bunch of lightly-armed medieval tribesmen, became drunk on old-fashioned imperial triumphalism, and denounced me as "crazy," or worse. But most of them had never been to Afghanistan and knew nothing about the Pashtun tribal people. I had covered the struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980's and was well aware of the leisurely pace of warfare favored by Pashtun warriors.

"Do not stay in Afghanistan," I warned in a 2001 article in the Los Angeles Times. The longer foreign forces remained in Afghanistan, the more the tribes would fight against their continued presence. Taliban resumed fighting in 2005.

Now, as resistance to the US-led occupation of Afghanistan intensifies, the increasingly frustrated Bush administration is venting its anger against Pakistan and its military intelligence agency, Inter-Service Intelligence, better known as ISI.

The White House just leaked claims ISI is in cahoots with pro-Taliban groups in Pakistan's tribal agency along the Afghan border and warns them of impending US attacks. The New York Times, which allowed the Bush administration to use it as a mouthpiece for Iraq War propaganda, dutifully featured the leaks about ISI on front page. Other administration officials have been claiming that ISI may even be hiding Osama bin Laden and other senior al-Qaida leaders.

The Bush administration claims that CIA had electronic intercepts proving ISI was behind the recent bombing of India's embassy in Kabul. India and Afghanistan echo this charge. No hard evidence has yet been produced, but the US media has been lustily condemning Pakistan for pretending to be an ally of the US while acting like an enemy.

President George Bush angrily asked Pakistan's visiting prime minister, Yousuf Gilani, "who's in charge of ISI?" An interesting question, since all recent ISI director generals have been vetted and pre-approved by Washington.

I was one of the first western journalists invited into ISI HQ in 1986. ISI's then director, the fierce Lt. General Akhtar Rahman, personally briefed me on Pakistan's secret role in fighting Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. ISI's "boys" provided communications, logistics, training, heavy weapons, and direction in the Afghan War. I kept ISI's role in Afghanistan a secret until the war ended in 1989.

ISI was primarily responsible for the victory over the Soviets, which hastened the collapse of the USSR. At war's end, Gen. Akhtar and Pakistan's leader, Zia ul Haq, both died in a sabotaged C-130 transport aircraft. Unfortunately, most Pakistanis blame the United States for this assassination, though the real malefactors have never been identified and the investigation long ago shelved.

On my subsequent trips to Pakistan I was routinely briefed by succeeding ISI chiefs, and joined ISI officers in the field, sometimes under fire.

ISI, which reports to Pakistan's military and the prime minister, is accused of meddling in Pakistani politics. The late Benazir Bhutto, who often was thwarted and vexed by Pakistan's spooks, always playfully scolded me, "you and your beloved generals at ISI."

But before Gen. Pervez Musharraf took over as military dictator, ISI was the third world's most efficient, professional intelligence agency. It still defends Pakistan against internal and external subversion by India's powerful spy agency, RAW, and by Iran. ISI works closely with CIA and the Pentagon and was primarily responsible for the rapid ouster of Taliban from power in 2001. But ISI also must serve Pakistan's interests which are often not identical to Washington's, and sometimes in conflict.

ISI was long and deeply involved in supporting the uprising by Kashmiri Muslims against Indian rule, and has been accused by India of abetting groups that have committed bombings and aircraft hijackings inside India, including a wave of terrorist bombings against civilians in Bangalore and Gujarat over recently weeks. For its part, India's powerful intelligence service, RAW, has mounted bombing and shooting attacks inside Pakistan.

The reason it is often difficult to tell whether Pakistan is friend or foe is because Washington has been forcing Pakistan's government, military and intelligence services into supporting the US-led war in Afghanistan and rounding up and torturing opponents of Pakistan's military dictatorship. Pakistan was forced to bend to Washington's will through a combination of over $11 billion in payments and threats of war if Pakistan did not comply. The ongoing prosecution of the US-led war in Afghanistan depends entirely on Pakistan's provision of bases and troops.

While Pakistan's government, military and intelligence services were forced to follow Washington's strategic plans, 90% of Pakistan's people bitterly opposed these policies. President-dictator Musharraf was caught between the anger of Washington and his own angry people who branded him an American stooge.

Small wonder Pakistan's leadership is so often accused of playing a double game.

The last ISI Director General I knew was the tough, highly capable Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmad. He was purged by Musharraf because Washington felt Mahmood was insufficiently responsive to US interests. Ever since 2001, ensuing ISI directors were all pre-approved by Washington. All senior ISI veterans deemed "Islamist" or too nationalistic by Washington were purged at Washington's demand, leaving ISI's upper ranks top-heavy with too many yes-men and paper-passers.

Even so, there is strong opposition inside ISI and the military to Washington's bribing and arm-twisting the subservient Musharraf dictatorship into waging war against fellow Pakistanis and gravely damaging Pakistan's national interests.

ISI's primary duty is defending Pakistan, not promote US interests. Pashtun tribesmen on the border sympathizing with their fellow Taliban Pashtun in Afghanistan are Pakistanis. Many, like the legendary Jalaluddin Haqqani, are old US allies and "freedom fighters" from the 1980's. When the US and its western allies finally abandon Afghanistan, as they will inevitably do one day, Pakistan must go on living with its rambunctious tribals.

Violence and uprisings in these tribal areas are not caused by "terrorism," as Washington and Musharraf falsely claimed. They directly result from the US-led occupation of Afghanistan and Washington's forcing the hated Musharraf regime to attack its own people.

ISI is trying to restrain pro-Taliban Pashtun tribesmen while dealing with growing US attacks into Pakistan that threaten a wider war. India, Pakistan's bitter foe, has an army of agents in Afghanistan and is arming, backing and financing the Karzai puppet regime in Kabul in hopes of turning Afghanistan into a protectorate. Pakistan's historic strategic interests in Afghanistan have been undermined by the US occupation. Now, the US and India are trying to eliminate Pakistani influence in Afghanistan.

ISI, many of whose officers are Pashtun, has every right to warn Pakistani citizens of impending US air attacks that kill large numbers of civilians. But ISI also has another vital mission. Preventing Pakistan's Pashtun, 15—20% of the population of 165 million, from rekindling the old "Greater Pashtunistan" movement calling for union of the Pashtun tribes of Pakistan and Afghanistan into a new Pashtun nation. The Pashtun have never recognized the Durand Line (today's Pakistan-Afghan border) drawn by British imperialists to sunder the world's largest tribal people. Greater Pashtunistan would tear apart Pakistan and invite Indian military intervention.

Washington's bull-in-a-china shop behavior pays no heeds to these realities. Instead, Washington demonizes faithful old allies ISI and Pakistan while supporting Afghanis


Asad 4 years ago

The Great American Tragedy - Failed Leadership, Pronounced effect Army Generalship in Iraq & Afghanistan

Everywhere we turn, we see breakdowns in Leadership: Education, Business, Government, Sports, Religion, and Families. I took a look back in history to compare some of the common traits of "Effective Leaders." Just as a reminder to us all. Please feel free to add those I've overlooked.

The Least You Should Know About Effective Leadership

1) Displays Of Effective Leadership Effective Leaders best display their leadership when they get in Challenging situations - For they always find ways to get themselves out

2) Characteristics Of Effective Leaders They are focused, They are tough & You can’t argue with their results

3) Focus Of Effective Leaders Leaders don’t look to blame others or even themselves - They are focused on solving problems

4) Importance Of Effective Leadership If Sr. Managers have clearly lost confidence in the strategy And have lost confidence in the Executive Leadership, the company is in Grave Danger

5) Influence Of Effective Leadership The members of their organization continually show when they need to work harder….they work harder - and when they need to work smarter .. they work smarter - and in the end … they consistently achieve the results they commit to achieve

6) Sound Of Effective Leadership Look … this is where we are …Here’s where we have to get… Here’s how difficult it will be …. Here’s a strategy that will get us there .. and Here’s what I need each of you to do….

7) Intuitive Nature Of Effective Leaders Those that are adept at the art of anticipating the need for change - And of leading productive change

8) Discipline Of Effective Leaders Effective leaders disciplining their thoughts in the moment

9) Vision Of Effective Leaders They seem to live ahead of their time - Many of their theories and ideas become reality - Their work is eventually accepted by the business community - They view the future as something to behold and not fear

10) Focus Of Effective Leaders They set their goals and then go after what they want - They keep taking the right next step - and they continue taking steps that move them toward their goal

11) Words Of Effective Leaders They say what they really think - Maybe it won’t be what people want to hear - But it will be the truth

12) Confidence Of Effective Leaders They have a confident sense of power and purpose - An almost daring willingness to accept the most difficult challenges - With the confident assurance they will overcome them

13) Desire Of Effective Leaders They are driven .... They are focused ... They want to win every time

14) Belief In Others - Of Effective Leaders They constantly demonstrate their ability - To develop people with average skills - To achieve exceptional performance

15) Standards Of Effective Leaders They measure themselves and their contributions - Based on the improved performance of those they help

16) Opportunities Of Effective Leaders They don’t wait for opportunities to be presented to them - They go out and create their own opportunities

17) Keys To The Success Of Effective Leaders Focused…. Concentrated…. Effort ... Knowledge .....Specialized Knowledge .. A deep understanding of people’s needs .... And how to effectively meet those needs .... Flawless Execution ... A commitment to … and a relentless pursuit ...Of Excellence

Friends, please file this one under "must read"...

A failure in generalship

By Lt. Col. Paul Yingling

"You officers amuse yourselves with God knows what buffooneries and never dream in the least of serious service. This is a source of stupidity which would become most dangerous in case of a serious conflict."

- Frederick the Great

Having spent a decade preparing to fight the wrong war, America's generals then miscalculated both the means and ways necessary to succeed in Iraq. The most fundamental military miscalculation in Iraq has been the failure to commit sufficient forces to provide security to Iraq's population. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) estimated in its 1998 war plan that 380,000 troops would be necessary for an invasion of Iraq. Using operations in Bosnia and Kosovo as a model for predicting troop requirements, one Army study estimated a need for 470,000 troops. Alone among America's generals, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki publicly stated that "several hundred thousand soldiers" would be necessary to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. Prior to the war, President Bush promised to give field commanders everything necessary for victory. Privately, many senior general officers both active and retired expressed serious misgivings about the insufficiency of forces for Iraq. These leaders would later express their concerns in tell-all books such as "Fiasco" and "Cobra II." However, when the U.S. went to war in Iraq with less than half the strength required to win, these leaders did not make their objections public.

Given the lack of troop strength, not even the most brilliant general could have devised the ways necessary to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. However, inept planning for postwar Iraq took the crisis caused by a lack of troops and quickly transformed it into a debacle. In 1997, the U.S. Central Command exercise "Desert Crossing" demonstrated that many postwar stabilization tasks would fall to the military. The other branches of the U.S. government lacked sufficient capability to do such work on the scale required in Iraq. Despite these results, CENTCOM accepted the assumption that the State Department would administer postwar Iraq. The military never explained to the president the magnitude of the challenges inherent in stabilizing postwar Iraq.

After failing to visualize the conditions of combat in Iraq, America's generals failed to adapt to the demands of counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency theory prescribes providing continuous security to the population. However, for most of the war American forces in Iraq have been concentrated on large forward-operating bases, isolated from the Iraqi people and focused on capturing or killing insurgents. Counterinsurgency theory requires strengthening the capability of host-nation institutions to provide security and other essential services to the population. America's generals treated efforts to create transition teams to develop local security forces and provincial reconstruction teams to improve essential services as afterthoughts, never providing the quantity or quality of personnel necessary for success.

After going into Iraq with too few troops and no coherent plan for postwar stabilization, America's general officer corps did not accurately portray the intensity of the insurgency to the American public. The Iraq Study Group concluded that "there is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq." The ISG noted that "on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals." Population security is the most important measure of effectiveness in counterinsurgency. For more than three years, America's generals continued to insist that the U.S. was making progress in Iraq. However, for Iraqi civilians, each year from 2003 onward was more deadly than the one preceding it. For reasons that are not yet clear, America's general officer corps underestimated the strength of the enemy, overestimated the capabilities of Iraq's government and security forces and failed to provide Congress with an accurate assessment of security conditions in Iraq. Moreover, America's generals have not explained clearly the larger strategic risks of committing so large a portion of the nation's deployable land power to a single theater of operations.

CLICK HERE FOR FULL STORY ---> http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198

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