Indian Army Vs the Chinese Army
Indian Army Vs China in Ladakh
I write this post with a heavy heart as a nationalist one cannot condone the thinking of the political leadership which in turn rubs off on the Army. I underwent the 41st Staff course at Wellington. One of the exercise as part of the curriculum is a study tour of the Northern or eastern border. Which study to tour to take is the option of the student officer? I opted to visit the Northern border for a first-hand study.
The visit to Ladakh was an eye-opener. We visited the various Indian Army formations facing China and had a one to one interaction with the Deputy GOC. Some of the results of that interaction is summarized below.
a) We learned that the Indian army had one division facing China in a holding role. On query, we learned the Chinese on the opposite side had 6 divisions. This didn’t make sense, one division vs. 6?
b) The 1962 border war had resulted in large areas being occupied by China. After the cease-fire, the Chinese vacated the areas they had occupied and went back to their earlier line of control.
c) This land vacated by China is now a no-man's land with China occasionally patrolling it. On query, we were specifically told by the GOC that the vacated area by China was out of bounds for the Indian army and they only watched as once in 3 or 4 days the Chinese trucks came and went away. On query as to why the Indian army did not go back and occupy the territory which India claims as Indian Territory, the reply was that these are the instructions of the government at Delhi.
d) It also appeared that the in the event of a war the Indian army had no plans for an offensive into the occupied area of Ladakh or Tibet.
It also came to light that the Chusul airfield close to the line of control, which was the scene of some bitter fighting during the 1962 war, was not operational. On query as to why it was not made operational when it was in Indian territory. We were told that these were the instructions of the Central Government so as to not antagonize the Chinese.
All this makes sad reading and shows that the Army which mirrors the policy of the Central government may still lead India to another defeat as a when there is another clash. I do not think anything is learned by India after 1962. One must read Kautaliya, that master of political thought, to realize that a dread of an enemy is a sign of defeat. Sadly the political leadership intent on filling its coffers with hard cash has no time for the greatness of India. I wonder the pot-bellied ministers sitting in Delhi have even heard, let alone read Kautaliya.