Wittgenstein and the Ineffability of Ethics and Metaphysics
In “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” Wittgenstein’s most substantial evaluation of ethics and morality can be deduced. This paper argues that if the ethical elements of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus are observed in relation to a particular notion of morality, they then highlight a radical and consistent alternative to conventional ethical conceptions. Consequently, this option presents a highlight on the main claim postulated by Wittgenstein that “it may not be possible to express ethics and its necessity” (Wittgenstein 97). Moreover, we continue to postulate that the reasons making Wittgenstein to disregard ethics are overshadowed by further research on necessity which the author carried later and published in an article “On Certainty”.
Wittgenstein’s main concept of ethical analysis has two perspectives: The first focuses on ethical propositions which can only be portrayed, but not verbalized and cannot be confined in words (Kallay, 2012). The second perspective is that of ethical utilization of language which is commonly signified by logical and official rightness (Conant, 2000; Fleming and Payne, 1989). A closer examination of Wittgenstein main argument in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus presents different perspectives of ethics and morality (Conant $ Diamond, 2004). A good example is on how various sentences can be interpreted differently.