When Will Russia Invade Europe?

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   My Esotericposted 2 days ago

   It is only a matter of time now before Putin tries now that Trump has started reducing the ONLY thing in his way from doing so.
   
   "The loss of 5,000 US troops in Germany is just the tip of the challenge facing Europe"
   
   It may be the "tip" of the challenge for Europe, but it will be a challenging facing American National Security (or the lack there of).

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      CHRIS57posted 45 hours agoin reply to this

      A word from those supposedly concerned in Germany.
      
      1. Doesn´t exist a congressional mandate (whatever the wording is) to keep a specific number of US troups in Europe? This implies that troups must be relocated withing Europe, possibly to Poland? I believe in Spain US troups would not be welcome ...
      
      2. The massive failure of giant USA in Iran and the success of small Ukraine´s drone army leads to rethinking of European military strategies outside of NATO alliance. Germany pursues strong bilateral military ties, foremost combining G´s industrial backbone with Ukraine´s battlefield experience.
      
      3. Chancellor Merz´s path of meandering between Trump appeasement and Trump criticism is seen very controversial in german public.
      
      4. After the fall of the Soviet Union, its industrial power (not its natural resources) was divided between Russia, Ukraine, mostly Baltic States and to a small extent to the "stans" in middle Asia. That left the Ukraine and Russia with even chunks of industry. Today we see the result: With western financial support and better organisation Ukraine is developing and outperforming war related production.
      
      5. By now it is obvious that Russia can not defend its vast territory and at the same time pursue aggressive actions. Russia´s industrial backbone resembles that of the Netherlands or Belgium, by far not enough for imperial ambitions of Putin.
      
      6. The only reason why Putin would start another war is to keep war economy running. But Russian economy is running out of money. China is still supporting Russia, but as pragmatic as Chinese are, the cut supplies if not payed for. A real quagmire for Russia. No immediate threat to Europe.
      
      But who knows what crazy world leaders like Putin or Trump are likely to do if cornered?

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         Sharlee01posted 41 hours agoin reply to this

         I think you’re raising some fair and logical points about shifting strategy in Europe, but a lot of this leans on assumptions that don’t fully hold up when you look closer.
         
         On troop levels, there isn’t a permanent requirement to keep a fixed number in one place like Germany. What Congress has done at times is restrict reductions below certain thresholds without justification, but that doesn’t mean troops must stay put. In practice, the U.S. has been repositioning forces eastward since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, especially into Poland and the Baltics, which arguably strengthens deterrence rather than weakens it.
         
         On the idea of a “massive failure” in Iran versus Ukraine’s drone success, that comparison is a stretch. The U.S. and Iran are not in a direct conventional war, and Ukraine’s drone innovation is impressive, but it’s also heavily enabled by Western funding, intelligence, and technology. That’s not Europe moving “outside NATO", that’s NATO adapting through Ukraine.
         
         Germany pursuing bilateral ties with Ukraine also isn’t a departure from NATO, it’s happening within the broader NATO framework. European countries have always had side agreements; that’s not new, and it doesn’t replace the alliance structure.
         
         On industrial comparisons, saying Ukraine is “outperforming” Russia or that Russia’s base resembles the Netherlands or Belgium oversimplifies things quite a bit. Russia has shifted to a wartime economy and still produces large volumes of artillery and munitions. Ukraine has been more innovative in areas like drones, but it’s also dependent on sustained Western support. Those are two very different kinds of capacity.
         
         The claim that Russia “can’t defend its territory and pursue aggression” is also questionable. Historically, Russia has accepted internal vulnerabilities to project power externally, look at both the Russo-Georgian War and the annexation of Crimea. Economic strain didn’t prevent those actions, and it hasn’t stopped the current war either.
         
         Finally, saying there’s “no immediate threat to Europe” feels too confident. A full NATO war may be unlikely, but Russia has already demonstrated willingness to use force in Europe. Threat isn’t all-or-nothing; it’s about capability and intent, and both still exist.
         
         I think the more realistic view is somewhere in the middle: Russia is constrained, but not harmless; NATO is evolving, not collapsing; and troop movements matter, but they’re just one part of a much bigger deterrence picture.

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            CHRIS57posted 39 hours agoin reply to this

            ...Russia is constrained, but not harmless; ...
            
            I would put it more direct:
            Putin is cornered, he has no way out. He started the war for pure imperial desires and he failed. Now the Russian population starts feeling the pain and he is afraid.
            Russia is harmless - Putin is not. Question is not invasion of some NATO member but who will be restraining him from going nuclear,  crazy as he is?

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            1. 83

               Sharlee01posted 38 hours agoin reply to this

               I think we’re actually closer in agreement on the broad concern, but I’d push back on a few points of framing.
               
               Putin is clearly the central decision-maker and did choose this war, but I’m not convinced ‘cornered with no way out’ reflects reality. Russia is under strain, but it still has political, economic, and military options short of some kind of final desperation. Authoritarian systems tend to adapt under pressure rather than suddenly reach a point of no return. Just my view...
               
               I also don’t think it’s accurate to separate ‘Russia is harmless, Putin is not.’ Russia’s state capacity, military structure, and nuclear arsenal are exactly what matter here, not just one individual acting in isolation.
               
               On the nuclear concern, I’d be careful with the idea of a single person needing to be “restrained from going crazy.” Nuclear use isn’t typically a one-person, impulsive act; it sits within command structures, strategic calculations, and escalation thresholds that involve multiple layers of control. That’s a big part of why deterrence is still considered effective even in high-tension situations.
               
               So I’d still land where I started: Russia is constrained, but not harmless; NATO is adapting, not collapsing; and escalation risk is real—but it’s more systemic than personal.

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         GA Andersonposted 41 hours agoin reply to this

         I would bet that the "congressional mandate' thing would be ignored. Your second point seems the most rational of the lot.
         
         The point about Iran's ability to survive seems right, but it is the 'change in warfare' point that looks most relevant to the OP's question. Drones have changed everything, and it looks like Europe's military leaders are paying attention.
         
         Hopefully, your fifth point will turn out to be as true as recent news appears to indicate (a BBS story about Russians surrendering to drone vehicles).
         
         GA

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         My Esotericposted 40 hours agoin reply to this

         1. Trump breaks the law whenever he feels like it - because Republicans let him and MAGA thinks that is cool.
         
         2. Agreed
         
         3. Makes sense - most European leaders seem to be doing that, but less and less so.
         
         4. Happily
         
         5. That is reality meeting Putin's ego - he, like Trump, is psychopathic.
         
         6. Didn't say Putin was sane or rational, lol.

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      Sharlee01posted 41 hours agoin reply to this

      The idea that reducing U.S. troops in Germany directly invites Russian aggression doesn’t line up well with how NATO deterrence actually works.
      
      U.S. troop levels in Europe have never been static. After the Cold War, the U.S. drew down from roughly 300,000 troops in Europe to around 60–70,000 by the 2010s. Russia did not respond to those reductions with immediate expansion. In fact, the major escalation, Annexation of Crimea, happened during a period when NATO still had a stable presence in Europe. That suggests Russia’s actions are driven more by strategic opportunity and regional goals than by a specific U.S. troop count in Germany.
      
      Consider-- deterrence is not just about headcount in one country. NATO’s strength comes from:
      
      Article 5 collective defense commitments
      Forward-deployed multinational battlegroups in Eastern Europe
      Air, naval, cyber, and nuclear capabilities
      Rapid reinforcement capacity from the U.S.
      
      For example, since 2022, NATO has expanded deployments in Poland and the Baltics, not just Germany. A shift of troops from Germany to Poland could actually increase deterrence, not weaken it, because it moves forces closer to potential flashpoints.
      
      Third, the “ONLY thing in his way” argument ignores Ukraine itself. Russia’s invasion since Russian invasion of Ukraine has shown that Ukrainian resistance, combined with Western weapons and intelligence, has been a primary limiting factor on Russian expansion. That’s a material reality, not a political talking point.
      
      So perhaps a more grounded argument would be: troop movements matter, but they are one variable in a much larger deterrence structure. Treating them as decisive oversimplifies the situation.

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         My Esotericposted 40 hours agoin reply to this

         In my experience, it does.
         
         Reducing U.S. troops in Germany does not automatically or mechanically invite Russian aggression (my title was rhetorical), but it can absolutely weaken deterrence by reducing capability, slowing reinforcement, and signaling weaker U.S. commitment - especially when coupled with Trump's repeated threats not to live up to Article 5 responsibilities like NATO did for the US.
         
         If it came out this was a result of a secret agreement between Trump and Putin, I would not be surprised.

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            Sharlee01posted 38 hours agoin reply to this

            Reducing U.S. troops in Germany does not automatically or mechanically invite Russian aggression (my title was rhetorical), but it can absolutely weaken deterrence by reducing capability, slowing reinforcement, and signaling a weaker U.S. commitment, especially if such reductions were not offset elsewhere in Europe. That said, deterrence is shaped by the overall NATO force posture, not a single country’s troop levels, and the alliance continues integrated planning, rotational deployments, and forward capabilities across multiple member states.
            
            It is also important to separate rhetoric from policy execution. While Trump has often used critical language toward NATO allies and questioned burden-sharing, the United States has remained in NATO, continued joint military operations, and maintained formal alliance commitments, including Article 5.
            
            Consider this: The Russia sanctions framework established under prior administrations, particularly the extensive expansion under Biden following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has remained largely intact. Those sanctions are widely regarded as the most severe imposed on Russia by any U.S. president, targeting its banking system, energy exports, defense sector, and access to advanced technology. Under Trump, the core sanctions regime has not been dismantled or significantly eased; key restrictions have remained in place, and in some cases have been extended when they would otherwise have expired, alongside additional targeted sanctions in specific areas.
            
            Importantly, this continuity cuts against the idea that U.S. policy has been shaped to benefit Russia. Even where Trump has differed in tone or rhetoric, the actual policy outcomes have not involved relieving major economic pressure on Russia.
            
            It seems Trump’s policy record on this issue carries more weight than his rhetoric, and in practice, his actions have been more consistent with maintaining pressure on Russia than with the way his words are often characterized.  I see that, thus far, his handling of Russia has been satisfactory.

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   My Esotericposted 2 days ago

   This is the story behind that headline.
   
   https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/03/europe/g … urope-intl

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      Sharlee01posted 2 days agoin reply to this

      When I look at this situation, I try to separate the immediate political framing from the longer-term military reality. On one hand, a reduction of U.S. troops in Germany naturally raises concerns because the American presence has been a cornerstone of NATO deterrence for decades, and any drawdown can be interpreted as a weakening of commitment to European security. That concern is not unreasonable, especially given the broader tensions between the U.S. and some European governments, and the symbolic weight troop levels carry in alliance politics.
      
      At the same time, I also think it’s important not to treat this as an unprecedented or purely political break from the past. U.S. troop levels in Europe have always shifted based on global strategy, budget priorities, and changing security threats. The Pentagon has described moves like this as part of a force posture review, and Europe itself. particularly Germany, has been steadily increasing its own defense spending and military capacity in recent years. From that perspective, this can also be seen as part of a broader long-running debate about burden-sharing within NATO, rather than a sudden retreat.
      
      In my view,  the reality likely sits in between: there is both a strategic reassessment happening and a political layer that inevitably shapes how it is perceived. The concern about alliance stability is valid, but so is the argument that U.S. military posture in Europe is not static and has always evolved with global priorities.

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         peoplepower73posted 2 days agoin reply to this

         That's all BS. Trump is so sensitive to criticism, that he will counter punch (his words) anything and anybody to punish them because his feelings are hurt. . Pulling 5,000 trumps out of Germany is his way of getting even with the Chancellor. That is Trump's power play.
         
         German Chancellor Friedrich Merz publicly said the U.S. was being “humiliated” by Iran during the ongoing conflict. This triggered a strong reaction from Trump, who has repeatedly demanded more European support for the war.
         
         The Pentagon’s announcement came immediately after those remarks.

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            Sharlee01posted 2 days agoin reply to this

            Where I see the stronger, more grounded argument is this: Trump’s rhetoric can certainly influence how these decisions are perceived, by both allies and critics, but the core policy debate around troop levels, cost-sharing, and overall global force posture has been evolving across multiple administrations. So while the timing does look like a payback,  driven by past frustrations, it could also be seen as more of a broader strategic recalibration, with political messaging layered on top, rather than a simple act of payback. He drew down troops in Germany during his first term. I believe at this point, Germany is also now the largest defense spender in Europe. So the drawdown could have something to do with that.
            
            It is clear that recently, Trump has continued to speak critically about Germany and Chancellor Friedrich Merz, largely in the context of NATO burden-sharing and broader defense policy disagreements. His comments have focused on Germany’s role in collective security, with renewed criticism of what he views as insufficient responsibility within NATO and ongoing reliance on U.S. military support. Alongside this rhetoric, he has also linked the issue to discussions about reducing or reassessing U.S. troop levels stationed in Germany, framing it as part of a broader effort to rebalance American commitments abroad.  Does appear, in my view, like he is dishing out payback.

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               My Esotericposted 40 hours agoin reply to this

               It is his rhetoric, psychosis, and reaction that are important. All that other stuff is simply filler and fluff to obfuscate the real problem, in my opinion.

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            My Esotericposted 40 hours agoin reply to this

            That sensitivity and response is a hallmark symptom of his Psychopathy.

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            My Esotericposted 40 hours agoin reply to this

            Besides, I don't think Hegseth is capable of conducting or even understanding a threat assessment. Especially if it concludes something different than what Trump told him the outcome was to be.

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         My Esotericposted 40 hours agoin reply to this

         "At the same time, I also think it’s important not to treat this as an unprecedented or purely political break from the past. " - I am going to argue that it actually was unprecedented and purely political.'=
         
         My research shows that in anticipation of the Soviet Union collapsing at the end of 1991, America had decided to begin reducing forces in Sept 1990. The Soviet Union officially collapsed on Dec 31, 1991 and reductions in force accelerated massively. By the end of 1992, troop levels were down to 100,000 by 1996 from 312,000  Reason - Reduced Threat from Russia
         
         Forces stabilized for awhile then in 2004, Bush began another threat assessment which led to another 20,000 reduction. By the time Obama came along, it was down to 80,000. Reason - Reduced Threat from Russia
         
         In 2012, Obama look again to see how the Russians were doing. Apparently, they weren't as Obama cut another 10,000 down to 70,000. Reason - Reduced Threat from Russia (In the background was a push for debt reduction)
         
         Stable for another 10 years. The Russia invaded Ukraine and things changed drastically. So, Biden increase troop levels 30,000 back to 100,000. Reason - Increased Threat from Russia
         
         There is a definable pattern there - the Threat Level from Russia.
         
         Now, let's look at Trump's rational - Europe didn't support his illegal war in Iran. How do we know this? Because Trump told us that -
         
         "When asked if he would consider pulling troops, he said, “yeah, I probably will,” and added, “Why shouldn’t I? Italy has not been of any help to us and Spain has been horrible. Absolutely horrible,” followed by, (his usual Lie) “We helped them [Europe] with Ukraine… but when we needed them, they were not there.”
         
         To me, it is no more complex as that.

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            Sharlee01posted 39 hours agoin reply to this

            I appreciate you laying out the historical troop-level changes in detail, because I think that context is actually important here. I don’t really dispute the pattern you’re pointing to regarding force levels rising and falling with the perceived threat from Russia—that part of your timeline broadly tracks with major post, Cold War shifts and the more recent reversal after 2014/2022.
            
            Where I see things a bit differently is in how we interpret what drives each adjustment. In earlier drawdowns, like post, Cold War or after the early 2000s Iraq/Afghanistan phase, the rationale was fairly consistent across administrations and closely tied to strategic reassessments by the Pentagon and NATO posture reviews, not just White House preference.
            
            That’s why I hesitate to frame earlier changes as “purely political,” because even when presidents announce or approve them, they’re usually following long-running defense planning cycles rather than initiating them in isolation.
            
            At the same time, I think your broader point about Russia is important to factor in here. If your underlying assessment is that Russia is not as strong a conventional military threat as previously assumed, something you’ve indicated in earlier comments about the Ukraine war, then it would make sense that they’d also view large U.S. troop levels in Europe as less necessary. From that perspective, a shift in posture wouldn’t automatically be “purely political,” but could reflect a genuine reassessment of the threat environment itself.
            
            On the Trump comment specifically, I think it’s fair to say he often tied troop presence to broader leverage questions with allies (burden-sharing, NATO contributions, etc.). But I’m not sure that automatically makes a drawdown “no more complex than that,” since even those arguments overlap with strategic debates that have existed inside NATO for decades.
            
            So for me, it’s less about whether there’s a pattern tied to Russia, which I agree is a major factor, and more about whether each shift is best understood as purely political versus a mix of threat assessment, alliance negotiations, institutional defense planning, and domestic priorities, which tend to be intertwined rather than separate.

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